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Abstract  
The poverty outcome in old age is affected by labour market reforms. Using our in house 
agent based simulation model IFSIM we show that sharing equally the parental leave can 
increase or reduce poverty among the elderly depending on the macro and behavioural 
responses that the Reform off-sets. In general, it can be good for (elderly) women provided 
that (i) it spurs them to work more, particularly in older ages (ii) it does not slow down 
economic growth (hence pension income growth) below a level when working more does not 
pay. Our simulations show that the effect of this Reform on poverty and gender inequality is 
time dependent: different outcomes might be expected for different generations depending 
on whether the balancing mechanism (in the state income pension) is present or not. In 
general, the Reform might not lead to positive outcomes if it occurs in conjunction with the 
striking of the automatic balancing, unless a behavioural response to work more among older 
workers (in response to the balancing) is also unleashed.  
 
Sammanfattning 
Äldre personers ekonomiska situation och eventuella fattigdom påverkas bland annat av 
reformer på arbetsmarknaden. I denna rapport används Institutets för Framtidsstudier 
agentbaserade simuleringsmodell för att undersöka om lika delning av föräldraledigheten 
kan öka eller minska fattigdomen bland de äldre: Vilka beteendeförändringar och 
makroeffekter kan reformen ge upphov till? I allmänhet kan delad föräldraledighet vara bra 
för (äldre) kvinnor förutsatt att (i) det ger incitament att arbeta mer, speciellt nära 
pensionsåldern, samt att (ii) reformen inte saktar ner tillväxten i ekonomin (och därigenom 
pensionsindexets tillväxt) under en nivå där ökat arbetsutbud inte längre lönar sig. Våra 
simuleringar visar att effekten av delad föräldraledighet på fattigdom och könsjämlikhet 
också beror på tidsperioden. Olika utfall kan förväntas för olika generationer beroende på om 
den automatiska balanseringsmekanismen (i det allmänna pensionssystemet) slår till. 
Generellt kan reformen leda till negativa effekter om den sker i samband med att den 
automatiska balanseringen blir aktiv, såvida inte beteendeeffekter (av balanseringen) ökar 
arbetsutbudet så mycket att det motverkar den direkta balanseringseffekten. 
 




1  Introduction 
This paper aims to study the theoretical linkages between the design of the pension system and 
that of the labour market and their interplay in determining poverty outcomes in old age, 
particularly from a gender perspective. Furthermore we aim to include macro feedbacks in our 
analysis of individual behaviours coming from the presence of automatic stabilisers which are 
meant to keep the pension system financially sustainable.  
The starting point for anyone interested to study gender inequality in old age, particularly in 
terms of pension incomes, is to frame the problem as one which arises during the working age. 
From a life cycle perspective it is well known that women tend to have different labour market 
histories than men: they are more likely to spend time out of the labour force due to child-caring 
responsibilities, they are more likely to work part time and earn lower wages. This gender gap 
during working years, together with e.g. longer life expectancy, are the natural reasons for 
gender differences in income during retirement (i.e. women having lower pensions than men and 
higher risk of poverty in old age) unless the pension system is designed so as to specifically 
correct for this (see Ginn, Street and Arber 2001). 
In Sweden, today we do observe a net gender difference in pension incomes and poverty rates. 
Retired women earn on average a pension which is 85% that of an equivalent male pensioner 
(SEB, 2007) but this ratio can be as low as 70% among low income groups (Normann, 2008).  
The poverty risk for elderly women is one of the highest in Europe, with 18% of over 65 women 
being poor against 9% of men (Zaidi, 2007). These inequalities are obviously matured in the 
course of the old pension system (pre-2003). An important question is to understand how much 
of an improvement the current pension system will be able to deliver to those who will retire 
entirely under it, particularly from a gender perspective, and especially considering that it is 
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more of an individualistic insurance system (i.e. more reliant on the individual contributions), 
with allegedly more labour supply incentives built-in. 
Furthermore, in Sweden, where female labour market participation is relatively high today (ca. 
70%), we still observe differences between men and women indicating that certain inequalities 
coming from the working years might not disappear among future generations of retirees. 
Currently, around 35% of women still work part time, a much higher proportion than men. Also, 
the average time spent in the labour market is lower for women (ca. 37 years against 40 for 
men), the average wage is lower (84-92% that of a man with the same job) and the retirement 
age is earlier (61.6 for women against 62.3 for men). When it comes specifically to parental 
leave, we know that for every child 80% of the allocated time is taken out by the woman; the 
woman tends to take out also most of the subsequent leave for caring for sick children (VAB). 
This paper is part of a wider research project whose aim is to answer the question: can we tackle 
gender inequality in old age better (and more efficiently) by changing the design of the pension 
system, e.g. by introducing some features which are described in the literature as particularly 
“gender friendly”, or by changing the design and / or incentive mechanisms directed to women 
in the labour market? In particular, this paper focuses on the latter strategy: we want to 
investigate how sharing equally the parental leave between the woman and the man, by 
supposedly increasing the woman’s labour market participation and wage, might lead to lower 
gender inequality in old age.  
In order to study the impact of sharing the parental leave on elderly poverty and gender 
inequality, we have adapted our in-house agent based micro-simulation model IFSIM (see 
Baroni, Zamac and Oberg 2009 for a model description). Our model simulates a synthetic 
population for a period of 150 years, and reproduces life cycle events and incomes for a large 
number of cohorts, while accounting also for macro feedbacks on micro behaviours. In the 
baseline scenario the current Swedish pension system is simulated as well as a parental leave 
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system in which, upon the birth of a child, women only stay home for a total of 2 years per child. 
In the alternative scenario, the same pension system is accompanied by a labour market system 
where by default the parental leave is equally shared, so that both men and women are to spend 
one year each home after the birth of a child. The model outputs and compares, among other 
statistics, poverty ratios by sex under both scenarios. It is important to stress that the model is not 
predictive but only a theoretical device to experiment the net effects of one change while keeping 
all other parameters constant.  
Our first hypothesis is that, as women share the parental leave with men, we might notice a 
labour supply effect consisting of women going into work (either full time or part time) in those 
years where they would have otherwise had to stay home; this should unleash a positive effect on 
their wage profile (which still might eventually trigger other labour supply effects further down 
the years); hence they should reach retirement with a higher amount of earned pension rights, 
both state and occupational. Depending on what happens to the men’s wages, this should overall 
improve women’s position relative to men and also their poverty standing. An important 
contribution of our model in this regard is its ability to account for macro-feedbacks coming 
from either the labour market (e.g. effects on growth) and from the pension features (e.g. from 
the growth rate of state income pension, or inkomstpension). 
Indeed, our results show a more complex picture than what we first hypothesized through 
theoretical deduction only. We will see that macro feedbacks on growth for instance will work 
against the positive labour supply gains for women in fertile ages, so that the net effect of 
sharing the parental leave on their retirement income is not always positive as first thought. At 
the same time, macro feedbacks from e.g. the striking of the automatic balancing mechanism in 
the pension system also unleash behavioural responses among older women workers which 
partly can mitigate the more negative consequences on output growth (and poverty). In a 
nutshell, so many feedbacks and interactions could not be foreseen without the aide of a 
simulation model.  
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Before going any further, it is important also to give some basic definitions and measurements 
chosen to describe “gender inequality”. In this context we refer to (i) ratios of women’s pension 
incomes relative to men’s (ii) poverty rates by sex (i.e. how many poor elderly women versus 
men are there). The latter measurement conforms with standard relative poverty indexes as 
described in e.g. Atkinson (1983). The relative measure of poverty refers to the individual’ s 
position within the income distribution rather than her degree of deprivation in terms of absolute 
human needs. Usually someone is considered “poor” if their income lies below the poverty line, 
which is commonly set to 60% of the median income. Most often household equivalised incomes 
are used rather than individuals’ in order to account for economies of scales related to household 
size. So the poverty definition refers to someone who lives in a household whose equivalised per 
capita income lies below the poverty line. 
2  The IFSIM Agent Based Model 
IFSIM belongs to a class of models known as Agent Based Models (ABM) which have been 
experimented within economics since the late 1980s. Quoting L. Tesfatsion, one of the most 
prominent ABM scholars: “ABM [..] is a method for studying systems exhibiting the following 
two properties: (1) the system is composed of interacting agents; and (2) the system exhibits 
emergent properties, that is, properties arising from the interactions of the agents that cannot be 
deduced simply by aggregating the properties of the agents. When the interaction of the agents is 
contingent on past experience, and especially when the agents continually adapt to that 
experience, mathematical analysis is typically very limited in its ability to derive the dynamic 
consequences. In this case, ABM might be the only practical method of analysis”. For a thorough 
review on the ABM methodology see e.g. Tesfatsion and Judd (2006). 
In this section we present a brief overview of our simulation model in its current form, focusing 
only on the parts however which are relevant to our analysis, namely the labour supply choice, 
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the Parental Leave benefit and the Pension System. For a full description of the model in all its 
components we refer to Baroni, Öberg and Zamac (2009). 
In our model, there are a few distinct, but interrelated, modules handling various events on the 
micro and macro level. The main events being simulated are demographic (i.e. whether the 
individual survives, whether he gets married, and if so whether he or she has a child in that year), 
educational, both in terms of the level (i.e. whether the individual is in school or if not what is 
her highest degree), and the quality of her human capital (i.e. how skilled the individual is at any 
given time, also when in work), finally his or her labour market status (i.e. if in work, or retired), 
and his or her income (based on the type and amount of human capital accumulated). Once the 
income is defined a rudimentary tax and benefit system is implemented to derive disposable 
income.  
The model incorporates at present four key agents: individuals, households, networks and the 
State. By agents here we mean java objects belonging to a specific agent class to which certain 
actions and characteristics are ascribed. Individuals are of course the main agent type being 
simulated; they are uniquely identified, they are born, die, procreate, leave home, study, work or 
retire. Individuals are grouped into households which are separate agents in that they have 
characteristics of their own: a separate ID, a given size, number of children, household income, a 
history and special “links” between household members such as inheritability of certain personal 
features (e.g. initial skills are inherited as the average of both parents). Networks are less 
tangible agents but still they exist as separate entities with a specific location and group 
composition. At the moment networks are lists of individuals grouped by age rather than 
household (i.e. an individual´ s network does not include his or her household). Networks are 
programmed so as to be able to perform certain actions for instance retrieve network 
characteristics such as mean participation or education rates which can be used by the agents to 
make forward looking decisions. Finally the State is the only single agent in the model i.e. the 
single class being instantiated only once. The State performs the tax and redistribution functions, 
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including setting a local tax rate to keep the budget in balance, calculating and collecting income 
tax, paying teachers´ salaries, student allowances, parental leaves and pensions, as well as setting 
some policy targets through which it can affect micro behaviours and macro outcomes.     
2.1  The Labour Supply Module 
Labour supply is currently modeled in order to capture the choice between house making, part 
time work and fulltime work for married women. The model is built on a number of behavioral 
assumptions (e.g. that women trade leisure for work in order to smooth consumption, or that 
consumption aspirations depend partly on one’s own consumption experience while growing up) 
and ad hoc parameters which we have tested by performing various sensitivity analyses. The 
model results appear robust against these checks (see Technical Appendix).  
All men and unmarried women in the model work fulltime unless they study or are retired. 
Married women can also be on parental leave, plus they can choose the amount of labour 
supplied between three states: full time, part time or voluntary home-staying. The idea behind 
our model for labour supply is that women supplement their husband’s income to reach an 
aspired equivalized consumption level
1. 
The woman´ s aspired consumption is a certain proportion of the average equivalised household 
income in any given year. This proportion is determined by (i) the same percentile in the income 
distribution as the women’s parent’s household when she was ten years old (so as to reproduce 
an inter-generational transmission of preferences or consumption aspirations) (ii) the real 
difference between equivalized income at age ten and projected equivalized income if the 
woman worked fulltime (iii) the woman´s educational level (i.e. everything else being the same a 
more educated woman will have a higher aspired consumption).  
 
 
1 N.B. This level is reset every year and raises over time with average incomes 
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In making her decision, the woman´ s aspired consumption is compared to a predicted 
equivalized income ten years in the future under three different scenarios: working fulltime, part 
time or voluntary house making. The projection is made by estimating an income regression 
among women (and men) with similar characteristics to the woman making the choice and her 
husband (e.g. education), who are currently 10 years older
2. The projection also accounts for any 
years spent on parental leave (since they effectively reduce the amount of work experience 
accumulated over a 10 year period if working full time, and the wage progression). Summing her 
husband´ s and her own projected income under the three labour supply choices available (and 
equivalising it by the household size) the woman is able to perform a simple check of which 
option gives her the highest payoff relative to her needs.  
A cost of child care is deducted from the projected income before it is compared to the aspired 
consumption. If the woman does not work the cost of child care is zero and if she works part 
time it is lower than if she would work full time. The projected, equivalized, consumption if 
working e.g. part time, is: 
 
familysize
childcare predinc predinc ctor discountfa
onsumption projectedc
pt fpt m I
pt




Where the subscript pt stands for part time the subscript m for male, the subscript f for female 
and the subscript I identifies a factor as being individual specific. In this decision the woman 
considers only half of the husband’s income as shared between them (i.e. assuming that only half 




2 N.B. Women who are above 56 will include pension income in their projection. 
3 This assumption is consistent with the fact that the woman here is benchmarking her available resources against an 
aspired consumption level which is individual rather than for the whole household. 
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If the projected equivalized consumption is above the aspired equivalized consumption if not 
working then the woman does not work. If part time suffices for reaching the aspired equivalized 
consumption then the woman works part time and if only working fulltime suffices she works 
fulltime. If neither choice makes her reach the aspired equivalized consumption then she chooses 
the alternative with the highest projected equivalized consumption. Because of the fact that the 
cost of childcare is larger when working more it needn’t be that working fulltime is the 
alternative that gives the highest equivalized consumption for all women.   
Depending on the choice made, the wage will also be affected (i.e. those working part time will 
receive half of what they would have got if working full time, and also accumulate only half of 
the work experience). More generally, wages in the model are a function of the human capital of 
the individual as well as the human capital composition in the economy (skilled versus 
unskilled
4). The “price” of human capital (again, for skilled and unskilled separately) is set as its 
marginal product (hence it decreases the more human capital of one type there is in the 
economy). The individual wage is thus simply the product of the unitary human capital price 
times the individual´ s own amount of human capital (which is in turn partly inherited, partly a 
function of educational choices, both in terms of quantity and quality). Wages tend to increase 
when there is scarcity of one type of labour (e.g. skilled). Clearly these macro-feedbacks on 
wages will also influence the labour supply choice of married women e.g. everything else being 
equal, if the unitary wage for her educational level decrease, she might need to work more unless 
her aspired consumption decreases also by as much.  
 
 
4 In the model we assume as skilled any worker who has a University degree, while unskilled are all those who have 
schooling up to gymnasium. 
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2.2  The Parental Leave System 
The parental leave benefit is modeled according to the Swedish system (2007), with some 
simplifications related to the rules e.g. on number of eligible days for each parent etc. In our 
model we assume that only the woman gets the benefit within the couple, hence the amount of 
the benefit is calculated on her eligible income
5.  
The benefit comprises a guaranteed amount, for those who have no previous income history 
(such as students) and an insurance-related amount, for those who have earnings up to certain 
thresholds (i.e. up to 10 times the so called Basic Amount equivalent, which in our model is 
calculated to reproduce a level comparable with the Basic Amount for 2007 in Sweden, around 
40,000 SEK per month, i.e. 4,000 Euros ca.).  
Upon the birth of a child, people with no work history or students would therefore receive a 
minimum benefit corresponding (in daily terms) to around 0.45 percent of the Basic Amount 
equivalent. For a parent that is on a full time parental leave this would correspond to a monthly 
benefit of 13.5 percent of the Basic Amount. Most students that receive a child during their 
studying period would receive this amount.  
People in work instead first need to have their base income calculated (for the purpose of 
receiving an income related benefit). The parental leave benefit amount is set to 80 percent of the 
individual’s base income. 
The benefit is paid for two years after the birth of the child, after which the individual returns to 
their previous labour market status. This length of the leave is higher than what is actually 
possible to obtain in real life. However, we do not include the right to benefits when taking care 
 
 
5 In the Swedish system, a total of 480 days of parental leave are paid jointly, 90 of which are not tradable between 
the partners (i.e. each parent is entitled to 90 days which are lost if not used). 
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of a sick child nor do we include the effect of part time work when raising children. We thus 
believe that adding a longer initial leave compensates for this. 
Being on parental leave does not exclude per se the possibility to have another child, since the 
model allows women with a child older than one year of age to have another one. In these cases, 
during the overlapping period when the mother is looking after two children, the parental leave 
benefit amount is frozen. 
2.3  The Pension System  
The pension system is modelled according to the Swedish system with some simplifications 
related e.g. to the fact that the model does not yet have capital markets. Every retiree is assigned 
a public pension which is comprised of three elements: a premium pension, an income pension 
and a guarantee pension. The premium and income pension are related primarily to the amount 
of (notional) contributions paid by each individual during their working life and accumulated 
into their personal account and the rate of return determined by the Pension Authority.  
The premium pension is properly funded pensions which collects 2.5% of the individual yearly 
salary and invest into a chosen pension fund. Since in our model we do not have capital markets, 
we are obliged to make some exogenous assumptions about returns to such funds. Upon 
retirement the value of the fund is simply annuitized by dividing it by the remaining life 
expectancy. 
The income pension is instead based on a “notional defined contribution” model, which 
resembles a funded system (in that the insured pays yearly 16% of income into a personal 
account) but which however remains PAYG (in that his money is not invested but used to 
finance current pensioners’ expenditure while being earmarked for the future at a given interest 
rate). At the time of retirement (age 65), the individual will therefore have accumulated a certain 
notional lump sum which is converted into a yearly pension income, IP. The pension annuity is 
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calculated on the basis of a unisex life expectancy of 20 years at age 65 through a so called 
annuitization divisor, which assigns an expected interest of 1.6% on the remaining fund after 
retirement. Consequently the value of the annuity is adjusted yearly for real growth deviating 
from 1.6% (i.e. if the growth is lower the pension benefit is reduced and vice versa), as well as 
occasionally by the “brake” (if the balance ratio goes below 1, seen next section). 
Once the income pension is calculated, the individual will be checked to see whether additionally 
she will be eligible for a guaranteed pension. A guarantee pension will be awarded to all 
individuals, regardless of their social insurance contributions, who have an income pension 
amounting between 0 and ca. 45% of the average wage (this threshold has been set on the basis 
of the 2008 system). Those who have an income pension equal to zero (i.e. no income pension at 
all), will be entitled to the maximum amount of guarantee pension, currently fixed at ca. 33% of 
the average wage. For those with an income pension above zero, yet below the maximum 
pension income threshold, more precisely up to 1.26 basic amounts (1.12 for couples)
6, the 
income pension amount is withdrawn from the maximum guarantee pension amount by 100% 
(so in practice the total pension income of these people will be equal to the maximum guarantee 
pension, albeit the composition will be split between income and guarantee pension). For those 
with an income pension between 1.26 and 2.7 basic amounts (1.12 and 2.72 for couples), the 
maximum amount of guarantee pension will be tapered away at a rate of 48% for every 
additional unit of income pension. 
Beside the public pension, we also let people with an income above 7.5 basic amounts (i.e. 
average earners and above) contribute into a DB occupational pension which on average pays in 
retirement around 65% of last earnings (above 7.5 basic amounts, 10% below). The contributions 
 
 
6 A basic amount is an accounting device used in the calculation of several benefits and corresponding to ca. 40,000 
Swedish Crowns in 2008. 
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to the occupational pensions vary to keep the system balanced every year, and they increase with 
age.  
2.4  The Automatic Balance Mechanism 
One of the most important innovations in the “new” Swedish pension system has been the 
introduction of an automatic balance mechanism meant to preserve both financial balance and 
inter-generational fairness
7 within the PAYG component of the public pension (the income 
pension). The automatic balance mechanism allows keeping a fixed contribution rate while also 
preserving the long term financial sustainability of the PAYG system, essentially by reducing the 
pension liability when needed.   
By default, the income pension and the notional pension accounts are indexed to the growth rate 
of average income. This indexation will be interrupted whenever the automatic balancing 
mechanism is triggered, and an alternative indexation will kick in, at the system’s internal rate of 
return. 
The automatic balancing mechanism is triggered when the system’s liabilities exceed its assets. 
The actuarial method of what should be counted as assets and liability is the key factor. The 
PAYG system in fact counts as Contribution Assets not only the flow of current contributions 
into it, but also the discounted value of the future expected contributions; this is based on how 
many years of “sustainable” contributions the state can count on, given current income and 
mortality patterns, what is known as the expected turnover duration. This is the sum of the 
expected pay-in and pay-out duration, in steady state, or, in other words, the number of years 
which, multiplied to the current annual contribution flow, would perfectly match the system’s 
PAYG liability prevailing at the time of measurement. The expected duration is currently set at 
 
 
7 See O. Settergren, NFT 2/2003  
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33 years (but is regularly recalculated), based on the average age at which contributions are paid 
and pensions disbursed. Additionally, the accounting of the system’s assets include the so called 
buffer fund, which collects any surplus from the yearly contributions flow to the PAYG system 
and invests it in the capital markets (thus making the PAYG system effectively mixed or partly 
funded). 
The system’s Pension Liabilities are accounted as the flow of expected future discounted pension 
payments given the present demographic structure, i.e. the total pension liability to those who are 
alive today and who have not yet started to draw their pension (based on the current value of 
their notional account) plus the remaining liability towards those who are already drawing their 
pension, based on current life expectancy by age (no projections are used). 
The automatic balance mechanism therefore is calculated by the following Balance Ratio and 
Balance Index: 
(3)     Balance Ratio  = 
bility PensionLia
BufferFund onAssets Contributi +
 
 
(4)    Balance Index =         if Balance Ratio < 1  x IncomeInde io BalanceRat *
When the balance ratio exceeds one, the system has a surplus i.e. it has sufficient assets to insure 
against the liabilities. If the ratio goes below one instead, it means that the assets are not enough 
to cover the liabilities and that the system is financially unbalanced. If this was to persist, the 
buffer fund would be depleted. This situation is indeed possible since liabilities and assets are 
likely to grow at different rates.  
The balance index—obtained by multiplying the income index by the balance ratio when this is 
below 1—is the rate at which the pension liability must be indexed to ensure that assets and 
liabilities are equal, or in other words the system’s internal rate of return. The system’s internal 
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rate of return is a function of (i) the growth in the contribution base (e.g. population aging would 
imply lower growth in the contribution base), of the change in age-related income and mortality 
patterns (i.e. changes to the expected turnover duration), and of returns to the buffer funds (e.g. a 
financial crisis), all of which would affect the growth of the assets side, and of (ii) changes to the 
life expectancy which will affect the growth of the liability side. Unequal changes to the growth 
of assets against the growth of liabilities will require the balance index to work as a levelling 
mechanism, by lowering the liabilities so that balance will be eventually restored and income 
indexation resumed.  
In practice, the triggering of the balance index will mean that all notional pension accounts as 
well as income pensions being paid out will be indexed by the system’s internal rate of return 
rather than the rate of growth in average incomes. As the balance index is lower, the liabilities 
will start decreasing; at some point, as the liabilities decrease and the balance ratio increases 
again, the balance index will reach the income index levels and normal indexing can resume. 
It is important to notice one effect of using the balance index (also commonly known as the 
“brake”). When the brake is on, both workers’ notional accounts and pensioners’ income pension 
will be subject to balance indexing. However, for most workers this will only represent a 
nominal loss compared to average income indexation, which they hypothetically could 
compensate by raising labour supply; pensioners instead will experience a real loss as their 
pension benefit will fall relative to what was initially “promised” to them on the basis of their 
accumulated savings and life expectancy. In other words they will experience a lower return to 
their pension savings when the brake is on compared to what they would have got if the system 
had remained balanced. Therefore, the on-set of the automatic balancing may threaten the inter-
generational fairness achieved when both notional pension capital and pension benefits are 
indexed by average income growth. The system would, without balancing, produce a rather 
stable cohort benefit/contribution ratio and stable average pension to average income ratio across 
cohorts (see Settergren, NFT 2/2003, page 104). 
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3  Key Interactions 
It is useful at this point to draw attention to those micro-macro interactions which characterise 
the IFSIM model. Figure 1 in the Technical Appendix summarises the main feedbacks taking 
place between most variables of interest at any simulation time t. Here we try to spell them out 
and to hypothesise some of the feedbacks which sharing the parental leave might trigger.  
The main interactions in the baseline model involve educational and labour supply choices, wage 
and disposable income formation, the tax and benefit system and fertility. The red line in the 
story goes approximately as follows: the economy is driven by human capital accumulation and 
population growth (i.e. no physical or financial capital in the model). People choose their 
educational level on the basis of the observed wage difference between skilled and unskilled 
labour: when the wedge is greater more people want to become highly educated (while at the 
same time, as an effect of the supply increase, more educated people will push down their wage 
relative to the unskilled wage, so that a constant alternation in wage dynamics is produced). A 
more educated workforce results in any case in higher output and higher average incomes. 
Individuals, who are interacting agents and constantly learn from their environment, use their 
knowledge e.g. about average incomes to form their aspirations (e.g. aspired consumption) and 
their expectations (e.g. projected incomes). When the average wage increases, also the aspired 
consumption of an individual is going to increase, and most likely also her propensity to work 
(as the opportunity cost of not working becomes higher
8). If the return to work increases, fertility 
is also likely to be lower (again, the opportunity cost of having a child becomes higher). If the 
effect on fertility is large enough, at the aggregate level this might result in an aging or even 
declining population in time (especially if we include social pressure effects, i.e. lower nativity 
rate in one´ s own network, then we can see the emergence of a fertility trap); this in turn might 
 
 
8 N.B. Childcare costs however will also increase (since they are a fraction of average income) so the labour supply 
effect is uncertain. 
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off-set the positive output gains we originally had from a more educated workforce, reducing 
output growth but also provoking imbalances in the tax and benefit system (e.g. it might   
endanger the PAYG component of the pension system and lead to the striking of the automatic 
balancing mechanism). In sum, the net effects of all these micro-macro interactions are too 
complex to be solved analytically and that is why we rely on a model such as IFSIM to simulate 
them instead. 
What micro-macro feedbacks could be triggered by sharing the parental leave between the 
parents. The main implication is that married women will be able to free one more year (per 
child) when they will be able to choose to study
9, to work full or part time, or to be home. This 
will entail a likely increase in their labour market participation in fertile ages, which (for any 
educational level) will then entail a greater accumulation of work experience, hence steeper 
wage profile and greater accumulation of pension rights. At the same time, it is also possible that 
some women will reduce their labour supply in older ages since the increase in work experience 
obtained in earlier years might mean that they can reach the aspired consumption level by 
working less later on. The net effect of the Reform on life-cycle labour supply thus becomes 
uncertain from the theoretical point of view (plus it also depends on how the man´ s wage and 
experience profile is affected, as the labour supply choice is based on incomes from both 
spouses). Furthermore, working more in fertile ages might also imply a lower amount of children 
by age 40, as the cost of additional children becomes higher once wage growth steepens up in 
those years (in the long run). Lower fertility might contribute to more sluggish output growth. At 
the same time, men will now have to work one year less (1 year of parental leave for every 
child), which will result in e.g. possibly lower wage increases for them; this might have a 
negative impact on total output (since men occupy a bigger share of the labour force, plus it will 
create a disincentive to get higher education and accumulate skills for younger men). Lower 
 
 
9 In the model individuals are allowed into University until age 32. 
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output will in turn translate into a number of further feedbacks, e.g. in education (less people 
might get educated), or lower aspired consumption (possibly lowering even more the labour 
supply response of women). 
If a macro feedback on output should be triggered from the Reform, it is not unlikely that women 
will also be affected negatively, so that their initial gains might be counterbalanced by some 
losses coming from these very macro feedbacks (e.g. lower growth which in turn might imply 
lower wages, lower benefits etc.), which eventually might lead to an undesired outcome: lower 
welfare in old age despite having worked more.  
The performance of the pension system will also be affected by this Reform. This is both 
indirectly (as the Reform might affect total output and output growth, which in turn affects the 
parameters of the system, e.g. the income index growth) and directly, as e.g. any labour supply 
response associated to the Reform will affect the balance of the pension system.  
We will now look at our simulation results to see how these mechanisms function in practice and 
to see whether some of our hypotheses indeed gets confirmed by the model. 
4  Simulation Results 
In the next sections we will present several different results to demonstrate the following main 
ideas:  
•  The risk of poverty in old age is a function of the labour supply choices made before 
retirement. In so far as sharing the parental leave (the “Reform”) affects the consequent 
labour supply choice of women, there is going to be a direct effect on their poverty levels in 
old age. Furthermore, indirect effects will depend on macro economic feedbacks (e.g. lower 
growth, lower aspired consumption) which might be triggered by the Reform, and which 
could affect the value of pension income (e.g. through lower indexation). Another important 
macro feedback is given by the striking of the automatic balance mechanism (regulating the 
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financial sustainability of the inkomstpension system) which can also be affected by the 
Reform and also matters for the poverty outcome. 
•  The gender inequality outcome of the Reform (in terms of both the poverty as well as the 
pension income ratios by sex) varies also with the striking of the automatic balance. More 
generally the macro feedbacks generated from the Reform in terms of output growth and 
changes to the income distribution are useful to cast light on these mechanisms. 
Our main finding is that variations to the public pension, generated by the Reform and by related 
behavioural and macro effects (e.g. changes in labour supply, resulting in different pension 
entitlements), can explain changes in pensioners’ poverty and gender inequality in old age, given 
the current pension system design. The latter is in fact based on a balancing mechanism sensitive 
to growth and to changes in other demographic and financial conditions (on-set by the Reform). 
At the same time the balancing mechanism plays a role in determining the Reform outcome also 
since it can spur behavioural responses in the labour supply of older women.  
The rest of the paper is divided in two sections: first we will analyse our results for one specific 
cohort, in a life-cycle perspective. Then we will look at the cross-sectional evidence (over 150 
model years), which will highlight how the current pension design plays a role in shaping the 
outcome of our labour market reform.  
4.1  Results for one cohort 
We first want to study the effects of sharing equally the parental leave and compare the outcome 
of this Reform against the Baseline scenario where women take out the entire duration of the 
leave (2 years). To this end, we want to follow one particular cohort throughout its lifetime so as 
to compare individuals who are comparable in all characteristics and in the macro environment 
surrounding them apart from the change in parental leave years and the related labour supply 
responses (both simultaneous to the parental leave years and life-long). We take a cohort which 
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is entirely born in the model, and for which we have simulated an entire lifecycle
10. We identify 
it as cohort 2075 since it is born in that artificial year (we must recall here that the model years 
are fictitious although the year of the survey inputted in the model is 1996). 
The first comparison we need to make is about the change in labour market status for women 
(since men can only work full time in the model), by age. In other words we map what 
proportions of women in that cohort in a certain age group work, study, are on parental leave or 
are voluntarily unemployed or “home makers”. 

















10 Recall that currently our model outputs data only from model year 2070 to 2150. 
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Focusing on the baseline first (Figure 1a), we see that about 15-20% of women between 20 and 
40 are on parental leave (dark purple column column), and the rest shares their time between 
studying (light blue), full time work (red vertical stripes), part time work (blue horizontal stripes) 
or voluntary unemployment (white). The proportion in part time or voluntary unemployment 
increases with age, possibly because as people get older, wages increase (including the 
husbands’) and the children grow (i.e. children costs decrease), so they can afford to work less to 
achieve the aspired consumption. However by age 60 we see again in increase in full time work, 
possibly due to the fact that, on the one hand, children are older, and on the other agents start to 
factor in retirement income in their decision (hence they need to work more again to reach their 
aspired consumption). 
If we move to the Reform scenario (Figure 1b), we first of all see expectedly a reduction in the 
time spent on parental leave among the 20-40 age group, and simultaneously an increase (for the 
same age group) of the time in part time employment, but also of voluntary unemployment. Over 
the later years we still see an even stronger trend in increased part time work and also greater 
voluntary unemployment at the expense of full time work (at least between 40 and 60 years old). 
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This can be explained by the fact that some women can now reach their aspired consumption 
earlier due to e.g. higher human capital accumulation in earlier years and higher incomes in years 
they would have otherwise been on parental leave.  
We can thus conclude that for, this cohort at least, the Reform spurs a net substitution effect with 
women trading parental leave for full time or part time while very young (i.e. between 20 and 
30), although later on in life there seems to be for some women an even greater income effect i.e. 
a reduction of full time work. At the same time we see that just before retirement (between 60 
and 64) some women go back to work full time. Over the life cycle in any case it appears that the 
income effect prevails (i.e. the Reform has reduced the total amount of labour supplied over the 
life cycle). 
We now show the effect that such a labour supply effect has on wage profiles for men and 
women of cohort 2075.  







































The most noteworthy result on the wage profile is that the main change from the Reform affects 
men: as a result of sharing parental leave, both men and women on average see a slower wage 
progression over time. By age 40, men in the baseline would have earned ca. 40,000 units 
(Figure 2a) while in the reform scenario (Figure 2b) they earn less than 35,000 (top green line). 
This implies a less steep wage progression and likely an increase in the time needed for a man to 
reach the household’s aspired consumption. This will have impacts on the labour supply choice 
of the woman. Women in general (red dotted line) also see a significant decrease in the steepness 
of their wage; by age 40 in the baseline they would earn ca. 30,000 units while in the Reform 
scenario they reach ca. 25,000. Since they work more in fertile ages compared to the baseline, 
this decline must be due to a macro feedback which lowers wages per capita. After age 40, due 
to the large income effect which pushes them to work less we see that they remain on the same 
wage level as at 40 i.e. no wage progression. Among the sub-set of women who work full time 
(black middle line) we also see a slight decrease in their final wage possibly due to the overall 
slowing down of the economy caused by lower male participation, partly due also to some skill 
depreciation taking place after age 50. Overall we see that they are also affected by slower 
growth in the Reform scenario, albeit less than men. 
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Our model is able to quantify the macro effect that such a decrease in men’s wages have on 
output growth
11. Since men represent the larger share of workers, the decrease in their wages due 
to staying some years at home to care for children, as well as their consequent decrease in human 
capital accumulation, results in a lower overall growth rate of the economy
12, as shown in Figure 
3.  











































Interestingly we see that as a result of keeping men more at home the economy in the Reform 
scenario grows at an average yearly rate that is 0.3% lower than in the baseline. Over time this 
cumulates to show an increasingly lower output as shown in Figure 3. We must consider at this 
point the effects that a lower output will have on women also, particularly on their pension 
accumulation since this will be negatively affected by lower growth and indexation.  
One effect of lower output, stemming from the construction of our labour supply function is that, 
everything else being the same, women´ s aspired consumption (which is a proportion of the 
                                                            
 
11 Recall that in our model output is only a function of human capital. A decrease in the average wage of the skilled 
in one period will result in lower supply of skilled workers in the next period. This will in turn lower aggregate 
output. 
12 Let´s recall that in our model output is only a function of skilled and unskilled human capital. In Figure 3, values 
on the y axis represent fictional units of output. 
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average equivalised income) will be lower. This will make it more likely that women who are 
not on parental leave (including older women) will need to work less. Moreover, those women 
who have worked more in fertile years will have accumulated a higher human capital than what 
they would have had in the baseline, which together with a lower aspired consumption ensures 
the reduced need to work. 
The negative effects of the Reform on women´ s life-cycle accumulation of pension savings thus 
become evident. In relative terms, in old age women end up being slightly worse off from the 
Reform: at age 64, as they have worked overall less than in the baseline, they have on average 
accumulated lower pension rights relative to men (accounted here as the size of their public 
pension accounts only, i.e. income and premium pension accounts). More precisely the average 
pension accounts of a woman have gone from 59 to 55% that of a man (even though men have 
also decreased their pension entitlements by working less).  
Consequently, if we compare the size of the average pension of a woman above 65, we will see 
that in absolute levels her pension will have decreased due both to working less and to the lower 
growth: her (smaller) contributions to the pension system, particularly to the state notional 
defined contribution (NDC) system will have yielded less. By the time she retires, her income 
pension will now be 87% of its value in the baseline scenario. That of a man will also be lower in 
the reform (85% of the value in the baseline). In relative terms she will be slightly better off, 
reaching an average public pension which is nearly 66% that of a man from 64% in the baseline.  
A useful result to understand poverty dynamics is to show how both female and male total 
pension incomes as a result of the Reform will change in terms of reliance on the guarantee 
pension. The guarantee pension is the minimum pension meant to bring everyone to a minimum 
level of income (roughly 33% of the average wage), and being gradually withdrawn for every 
additional income pension amount that the individual receives (below a ceiling of an income 
pension corresponding to 45% of the average wage). As we will soon show, there is a strong 
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correlation between having some guarantee pension as part of one’s pension income and being 
poor.  
If we look at the composition of the average pension income for someone born in 2075, in terms 
of which proportion of pensioner income comes from which source, we see that in general (i) the 
man relies more on the income pension than the woman and much less on the guarantee pension 
(Figure 4a) (ii) after the Reform (see Figure 4b), the average elderly woman relies a bit more on 
the guarantee pension and less on the income pension as her average income pension has 
decreased in absolute value due to lower growth in the economy, plus she has worked less over 
her life time (iii) after the Reform, the man does not experience any substantial change to his 
pension composition, on average.  
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In other words, we see that in the Reform, the hypothesised benefits from sharing the parental 
leave might not translate in more gains in old age, particularly for women, if we look at incomes 
and poverty rates in general, where instead the Reform seems to make women poorer. 
This result is confirmed when we output poverty rates by sex under the two scenarios.  
Figure 5 shows that poverty rates for women have doubled at retirement, from 10% of the over 
65 being poor to ca. 18%
13. This effect, due to the lower labour supply, is even more noteworthy 
since it exists despite that lower growth has also decreased the poverty line (here set at 60% of 
median household equivalised income).  
                                                            
 
13 Poverty here is measured on household equivalized income rather than individual. Let´s remember than a 
household in our model corresponds to a basic family unit. Clearly those who are poor are more likely to be single 
individuals and widows/widower, i.e. those for whom only one income counts. 
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Figure 5. Simulated Elderly Poverty rates and Replacement Ratios by sex at retirement year 2140 
(cohort 2075) 
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As women earn fewer rights to an income related pension, and rely more on the guarantee 
pension, it is understandable that they should become poorer in old age after this Reform (or 
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rather after the labour supply effects that the Reform spurs). The fact that elderly men are not as 
affected can be explained by the fact that, although they also work and earn less as a result of 
now going on parental leave, thus accumulating lower pension rights, their average loss is not 
enough for them to have to rely so much more on the guarantee pension.  
To understand this dynamics better, it is useful to see in general who is poor in the baseline 
purely based on the guarantee and income pension mix (since those who receive a premium and 
occupational pensions will most likely not be poor). In Figure 6 we see that most people born in 
2075 with some guarantee pension in their total would classify as poor at retirement (i.e. all 
those with an income composition to the left of the black line). Here it is clear how some people 
on the left of the line who have almost no guarantee pension still do not have enough income 
pension to move above the poverty line. 












14 N.B. The two lines refer to single and couples since they have different thresholds against which the guarantee 
pension is withdrawn. 
 
  30Institute for Futures Studies ◊ Working Paper 2010:5 ◊ E. Baroni 
 
In terms of the income distribution of elderly people for cohort 2075, it is interesting to see that, 
while lower life-time female participation and lower male wages have brought about a more left-
sided and wider distribution around the mean (see Figure 7b), more people in the Reform now lie 
from just above the poverty line to just below. Hence the proportion of poor increases, as shown 
in Figure 5, despite the considerable lowering of the poverty line due to lower growth. 
Figure 7. Simulated Income Distribution for retirees (cohort 2075)- Equivalized Income as a 
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4.2  Results for All cohorts  
When we look at all cohorts, we see a more nuanced picture than for cohort 2075, in particular 
we see that the poverty outcome of the Reform can also be positive i.e. sharing the parental leave 
for some cohorts might actually result in lower poverty rates for both men and women. The key 
differences in poverty results depend mainly on the features of the pension system (those related 
to the striking of the brake) and any related labour supply effect. Cohort-level and cross-sectional 
analysis might hide differences in this respect which in turn explain differences in poverty and 
gender outcomes between the two scenarios. 
We summarise our main elderly poverty findings in Figure 9, by model year. First however we 
start by giving the cross-sectional labour market impact for the over 65 in the two scenarios 
(Figure 8a), as well as some baseline results compared to real 2008 labour market statistics for 
Sweden (Figure 8b). 
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Figure 8. Full Time and Part Time Female Labour Supply in Baseline and Reform, by model 
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Overall, the model output from our labour supply module tends to reproduce quite well the age 
distribution of women in employment in 2008, with the exception of older women (55-64) where 
the model over-predicts employment (Figure 8b). This is expected since in the model retirement 
is fixed at 65 i.e. we do not model early exit from the labour market e.g. through disability or 
occupational pensions.  
At the cross-sectional level, we see that over time women in general tend to work less full time 
in the Reform than in the baseline, i.e. the growth in the number of women (of all ages) working 
full time in any given year is lower (Figure 8a, top black lines). As in the one cohort analysis, the 
reason lies in the fact that in the Reform, working full time pays less (due to lower output 
growth) and also that aspired consumption does not grow as much (due also to lower output 
growth). This output drop might be only partially compensated by a slightly larger number of 
women working part time in the Reform scenario (Figure 8a, grey dotted lines). Overall, at a 
cross-sectional level fewer women are in work at any given time in the Reform scenario. This 
result is compatible with what we saw was happening in a life-cycle perspective for cohort 2075.  
When focusing on elderly poverty, the first cross-sectional trend to notice is that in the baseline 
(Figure 9a), poverty tends to decrease over time for both older men (black line) and women (red 
line). Generally, women have slightly higher poverty rates than men, apart from the last years of 
simulation where we actually see the reverse and more men than women become poor. For 
women, this decrease might well be the effect of younger cohorts who retire having worked 
more full-time compared to earlier ones (as shown in Figure 10, black thin line). Indeed over 
time we also see a (cross-sectional) increase in the average income pension of both men and 
women which is likely to be driving the reduction in the poverty rate (i.e. this increase is greater 
than the yearly increase in the poverty line). Also, the reduction in the poverty rate among men 
can be ascribed to a general improvement in the position of the elderly in the income distribution 
due to e.g. an increase in labour supply among younger cohorts (by women, see Figure 8a, which 
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still has an impact on household income) and higher coverage of the occupational pension 
among the retirees (from ca. 72% in 2080 to 78% in 2145)
15.  
Figure 9. Simulated Elderly Poverty Rate by Sex and Model Year 






















15 Let us recall also that the poverty rate is calculated on equivalized household income hence it picks up changes to 
the household composition and income over time. 
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In the Reform scenario (Figure 9b), we see a slightly different picture, whereby poverty rates (by 
sex) are lower in the beginning compared to the baseline (14-17% instead of 18-20%) but then 
the poverty rate decreases much less over time, remaining above what it would have been in the 
baseline by the final years of simulation. So in essence it goes from being lower to being higher 
than in the baseline over time. We need to understand how any difference in poverty trends 
between the two scenarios might be linked to sharing the parental leave, either directly or 
indirectly (i.e. through secondary effects on either output, fertility or labour supply).  
The direct effects that sharing the parental leave has on elderly poverty rates (Figure 9b) can be 
attributed to the same labour supply mechanisms which we saw for cohort 2075, and that are 
confirmed in Figure 8a, namely a reduction in the life time supply of labour by women compared 
to the baseline, and the consequent diminishing of their pension claims by the time they retires. 
By working less over their lifetime, women end up relying more on the guarantee pension, which 
is strongly associated to being poor. 
The indirect effects of the Reform have to do with the macro feedbacks which follow from 
sharing the parental leave. We have already seen for cohort 2075 how lower male participation 
and human capital accumulation result in lower output growth. We will now look closer at those 
feedback effects which can be responsible for a higher poverty rate in old age (compared to the 
baseline). 
To shed light on this question, we output the impact of the Reform on poverty over the years 
(Figure 10); so we see that up until ca. 2135 the Reform has a positive effect on elderly poverty, 
i.e. poverty is lower compared to the baseline, while after that year the poverty rate is higher than 
in the baseline hence the effect is negative (like for cohort 2075). Figure 10 summarises the 
effect of the Reform on elderly poverty and shows how it goes progressively from positive (in 
the graph below zero) to negative (in the graph above zero).  
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Figure 10. Simulated Poverty Impact of the Reform on the Elderly, by model year  















































It appears that something happens around 2135 that is able to shift the results from positive to 
negative. In a similar fashion, from 2135 we observe a reduction in the average “depth” of 
poverty among the elderly in the baseline scenario, as measured by the so called poverty gap 
ratio
16 (Figure 11a), which is not present in the Reform (Figure 11b). 
                                                            
 
16 The average gap ratio measures the average distance of the poor from the poverty line as a percentage of the 
poverty line itself. 
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In order to understand better what other forces are at play here we must recall from section 2 
how the Swedish pension system is designed, in particular the feature which concerns the 
automatic balancing mechanism present in the inkomstpension. This mechanism was introduced 
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to strike only occasionally, when the system long term balance would be in danger due to e.g. 
demographic change. The system’s balance is calculated by comparing the actuarial long term 
liabilities (namely how much the Swedish state owes in pensions today if it was to pay them out 
to all contributors) with the long term assets (namely how much the State can receive as intake 
from the current and future contributors, assuming an average contribution period). When the 
liabilities should overtake the assets e.g. due to the rate of population aging the system’s balance 
is temporarily restored by lowering the growth of the income pension going to current 
pensioners.  
In our model, the balance strikes in the baseline scenario more or less uninterruptedly from 
around year 2135 (Figure 12a) to year 2150. In the Reform scenario instead, the brake does not 
strike at all (figure 12b). Why this difference? On the one hand, a lower labour supply 
participation in the Reform scenario lowers the system´ liability, so that the brake does not need 
to strike as early as in the baseline. This effect, together with lower growth rate, is indeed what 
makes the pension liability (black line in Figure 11) grow more slowly hence avoids (or at least 
delays) the striking of the brake in the Reform scenario.  
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Figure 12. Total Projected Assets and Liabilities plus Buffer Fund as a proportion of GDP, by 
model year 
(a) Baseline   
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In light of the above, we need to explain again (i) why the poverty rate and poverty gap decrease 
even though the brake is on in the baseline scenario (i.e. Figure 9a and 11a) and conversely (ii) 
why in the Reform, (Figure 9b and 11b) poverty and poverty gap end up higher although the 
brake is always off. This is allegedly against intuition (since the loss incurred by pensioners with 
lower indexing of the income pension would suggest higher and not lower poverty when the 
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brake is on). Something else must be happening in our model while the brake strikes, possibly a 
behavioural response which might help explain this. 
We pursue the hypothesis of a direct effect of the brake on poverty which could be due to (i) a 
behavioural response by older women once the brake is on, since they suddenly realise they need 
to work more just before retiring if they want to reach their aspired consumption (ii) the brake 
having also an impact on the income distribution e.g. it lowers the median income so that less 
people appear to be poor and the depth of poverty also decreases. 
We investigate hypothesis (i) and (ii) in the baseline and the Reform results, putting them now in 
relation to the striking of the automatic balancing.  
Looking at hypothesis (i) first, we want to investigate further whether the brake is associated to a 
labour supply response of older workers in particular. Indeed, as we saw for cohort 2075, it is 
possible that those older women who make their labour supply decision when the brake has 
striken will end up increasing their labour supply just before retirement
17 in response to the 
brake. The striking of the brake, which normally entails a reduction in the growth rate of the 
income pension benefit and account, is in fact going to reduce the projected household 
disposable incomes of those who are making the decision, thus raising the probability that they 
will have to increase their labour supply in order to reach their aspired consumption, at least 
temporarily
18. If they do so, they will end up accumulating larger pension credits right in their 
final years of work (when they have also reached their highest lifetime wage), both for the state, 
premium and occupational pensions. This means that when they actually retire, and the brake is 
 
 
17 Recall that the woman´s projection is based on an income regression done on a sample of women who are 10 
years older and with 10 years more work experience (10 more precisely for full time income projections; 5 for part 
time). For women who are above 56, this includes a sample of women who are already retired at the moment of the 
projection. If the brake is on in the regression year, its effects will be included in these women´ s projection of their 
future income. This is so even if the brake is actually no longer striking when they will retire. In this sense, women´s 
forecasting is imperfect. They do not account for the fact that e.g. their increased labour supply will end up affecting 
the probability of the brake striking again or not (most likely, it will delay it).   
18 By model construction, this period should last around 10 years. 
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still on, they might nevertheless experience a higher average income pension (or total pension) 
compared to those earlier cohorts who retired when the brake was off and worked less in their 
latter years since they had not needed to adjust their behaviour.  
This hypothesis seems to be confirmed albeit weakly by our data
19. If we look specifically at the 
proportion of over 56 women who are in work in the baseline (Figure 13a), we see a slight 
increase starting exactly around 2135 (of ca. 2% points); however the behaviour of older women 
shows fluctuations over time so that it is hard to attribute this particular increase in labour supply 
specifically to the brake. At the same time in Figure 13(b), i.e. the Reform scenario where the 
brake does not strike, labour supply of older women in the same years is generally lower. 
Around those years when the brake would be on in the baseline (and here is not) we in fact see a 
reduction in older labour supply from ca. 2140, which might well be correlated to the lack of the 
brake as an incentive to work more.  
 
 
19 N.B. Our evidence is not able to show a causal relationship between the striking of the brake and the increase in 
labour supply of older women, which might also be due to other factors such as higher aspired consumption levels in 
those years; however it shows some degree of correlation between the two events which might need further study. 
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Figure 13 : Proportion of 56-64 years old women working full time or part time 
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Moving on to hypothesis (ii), we look at changes in the median income over the years to 
compare differences in the baseline and the Reform which might be caused by the brake. To do 
this, we track the evolution of the median income in both.  
Figure 14. Median Equivalised Income by model year 
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Figure 14 shows the evolution of median income in absolute levels. In the baseline a downward 
spike is present around year 2140 which might well be due to the cumulative effect of a few 
years of the brake striking. No such dropping of the median is visible in the Reform around the 
same years. This also supports the evidence of overall a lower poverty rate in the baseline than in 
the Reform, as the poverty line will be also proportionately lower once the brake strikes.  
In figure 15 below, where we report the poverty rate of the elderly in the baseline first and then 
for the Reform, for a year before the brake strikes (2110) and for a year while the brake is on 
(2140). In the baseline clearly we see that the poverty rate has changed with the income of the 
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elderly growing faster than the poverty line, so that fewer lie to the left of the line in 2140 (from 
14% to 9% ca.).  
Figure 15 Poverty Rates of Elderly, year 2110 and 2140 
 Baseline  Reform 
Year 2110  13.6%  13.5% 
Year 2140  8.7%  11.3% 
If we look at the poverty rate for the same two years in the Reform scenario, we can notice that 
by 2140 the poverty rate of the elderly remains very similar to that of 2110, compared to the 
baseline, due to much less change to the underlying income distribution.  
This effect can be also attributed also to the fact that both men and women work less than in the 
baseline. Let us recall that, beside the brake, there are also more positive changes in the income 
distribution under the baseline scenario than the Reform, as an effect of higher and increasing 
female labour supply (cross-sectionally, See Figure 8), which benefit all households where a 
woman lives (since the distribution measure is household-based).  
A last observation concerns the effects that the Reform has on the financial costs of the system. 
Figure 16 below shows the trend in tax financed public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 
under both scenarios. Interestingly, the Reform generates higher costs, since it produces on the 
one hand higher poverty, which translates in higher coverage of guarantee pension, and on the 
other hand higher parental leave costs, since financing this benefit for men is more expensive 
(the benefit in fact replaces 80% of previous earnings and men have higher earnings than 
women). The increase in tax required to meet a yearly rise in public expenditures of ca. 2% 
points of GDP is likely to generate a series of other negative feedbacks e.g. lower investment in 
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education, lower fertility, which in turn over time would affect also poverty statistics (but which 
we do not assess here). 
Figure 16. Public expenditures on Guaranteed Pension and Parental Leave Benefit as a 

































5  Conclusions  
Our paper has conducted a theoretical experiment using our agent based model IFSIM. Our aim 
has been to study the dynamics of poverty in old age, particularly from a gender perspective, 
when changing conditions in the labour market should lead to higher women’s participation in 
the labour market, and consequently, higher accumulation of pension rights in retirement as well 
as lower poverty and inequality. 
In particular, we have chosen to see the effects of sharing the parental leave equally between a 
man and a woman upon the birth of their child (for a period of one year each), against a baseline 
scenario when women take the full amount of parental leave instead. 
We have simulated a labour supply choice for women comprising the possibility to choose 
between full time, part time and voluntary house work. Men can instead only work full time in 
our baseline model. The labour supply choice involves a trade off between working more and 
earning more in order to satisfy one’s aspired consumption level (varying with education and 
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parental upbringing), or staying at home to look after children (while also saving on childcare 
costs). While it is impossible to infer a priori whether the Reform creates incentives (e.g. by 
increasing the wage profile of women) to substitute leisure with more work, or rather the 
opposite (e.g. to promote earlier exit from the labour market as e.g. higher wages allow women 
to reach their aspired consumption earlier), still we do observe that sharing the parental leave on 
average is traded with a simultaneous increase in part time or full time work, i.e. a positive 
substitution effect for most women. However, forcing men also to stay home negatively affects 
their wage development and thus has an unexpected negative macro feedback on economic 
growth (since men are the higher share of the workforce in the model) and on fertility (since the 
opportunity cost of having a child increases for women), which in turn feeds back negatively on 
growth also. For our show-case cohort 2075, this macro effect can eventually result in a lower 
accumulation of pension rights for women also (since a large part of the public pension, the 
income pension, grows at the rate of incomes), thus reducing the return from working (by 
reducing the absolute gain in terms of pension accumulation). Thus our model allows us to take 
into account macro feedbacks within the individual labour supply choice, and to show that long 
term consequences might not be in line with expectations, as the Reform might even bring about 
higher poverty rates for women although they have worked more in fertile ages. 
Another contribution of the paper is to have identified a correlation between the striking of the 
automatic balancing mechanism (a crucial feature of the design of the Swedish income pension) 
and the poverty effect of the Reform, as well as its gender impact.  
Our model has in fact been able to capture another important behavioural feedback, namely an 
increase in labour supply of older women when the brake strikes (only in the baseline). This 
effect counterbalances the otherwise negative impact of the brake on pensioners´ incomes and 
poverty rates, by rising women´ s pension entitlements at retirement (from both occupational and 
state sources) and consequently rising the (equivalised) income of many elderly households (at 
least those which are married or single women households). Sharing the parental leave sets on a 
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series of macro-feedbacks which delay the brake: lower growth and lower fertility entail also 
lower income pension growth, and lower predicted pension liabilities in the system, while higher 
female labour market participation in fertile ages can be accompanied by lower labour supply in 
older ages (when the brake is off), which also entails a lower pension liability at the aggregate 
level. As the brake is not set on in the Reform scenario, also its positive effects on older labour 
supply and pension income composition are delayed, and so are the consequent gains in lowering 
elderly poverty and improving gender equality.  
We therefore conclude that the effects of sharing the parental leave on pensioners’ poverty are 
not straightforward, and there is no single answer as to whether sharing the parental leave is 
good or bad from the point of view of pensioners´ welfare. The outcome depends on a number of 
concurring events including macro and behavioural feedbacks, which our model IFSIM can 
suitably handle. An even more meaningful conclusion is to have shown that the effects of a 
labour market reform on poverty and gender equality can be substantially affected by the design 
of the current pension system; in particular including the behavioural responses associated to the 
striking of the pension brake in the analysis might be crucial to assess the impact of any reform.     
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Sensitivity Tests of the Labour Supply Module 
The labour supply Module makes a number of assumptions about the way married women 
choose how much to work. These assumptions are based on the idea that women will work the 
minimum amount necessary to reach a certain aspired consumption, once childcare costs are also 
accounted for. The decisional algorithm is calibrated on a number of hard-coded parameters. In 
order to test the extent to which results might depend on the choice of these parameters, we have 
tested the following as shown in the table below. More details can be available upon request. 
 
  
Parameter  Baseline  Baseline Test 1  Baseline Test 2 





Raise in Full Time 
Labour Supply 
slightly less steep  
Brake strikes earlier 
(from year 2070 ca.) 
Decline in Elderly 




- Rise in Full Time 
and Part Time Labour 
more steep 
- Brake does not strike 
as contribution raises 
more than liability 
- Decline in Elderly 
Poverty more steep 
 
Weight of Husband´s 




- Rise in Full Time 
1 
Outcomes: 
-Rise in Voluntary 
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and Part Time Labour 
more steep 
- Brake strikes earlier 
(from 2070 ca) as 
income pension 
liability increases  
- Decline in Elderly 
Poverty more steep 
 
Unemployment  
-Brake strikes earlier 
(from 2070) 
- More stable poverty 
(not declining) 
-Declining population 
as more women in 
voluntary 
unemployment leads 
to lower incomes 
which affect fertility 
choice 
Child Care Costs  7% of average income 
per capita for child < 
5 
5% of average income 
per capita for child > 
5 
TO DO  TO DO 
 
The sensitivity tests confirm that our model is robust to the choice of parameters since we see no 
change in the direction of our main statistics (e.g. labour supply totals, pensioners poverty rate), 
apart from very small variations in the levels reached in any given year (as expected), logically 
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Appendix: The IFSIM development environment 
The simulation model is developed in a java-environment using the pre-compiled package JAS 
1.2. JAS is a JAVA-based object-oriented simulation toolkit, specifically designed for agent 
based simulation modelling. JAS is developed and distributed (as freeware) by Michele 
Sonnessa, Dept. of Computer Science, University of Turin, Italy
20. 
 
JAS does not define a domain-specific language: it provides the JAVA programmer a collection 
of ready to use libraries, widgets and a set of methods to build such kind of simulations. A JAS 
model is an instantiation of a particular Java class (jas.engine.SimModel), creating a collection 
of agents and a schedule of discrete events performed over those agents. Our model is itself an 
instantiation of the JAS class SimModel. Therefore, it can interact with JAS library commands 
and features.  
 
JAS is a flexible tool which can be easily embedded in the user's own JAVA model.  In our case, 
the JAS library is included in the Eclipse development environment. The JAS User Interface is 
launched from within the development environment, allowing the programmer to run the 
simulation, as well as easily follow and analyze its outputs. In other words, the JAS User 
interface is an application through which the user can execute simulation experiments, loading 
JAS compatible models and controlling their execution. The main panel of JAS, once PABM has 




20 For more information, you can visit: http://jaslibrary.sourceforge.net/ 
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Figure 1 Screen dump of JAS user interface 
 
The Parameters window allows the user to change any model parameters of his or her choice, for 
instance the simulation times, or some policy related parameters, such as retirement age or 
schooling years, provided they are previously coded in the relevant “JAS parameter bag”. The 
Parameters window also allows to save the simulation output in an SQL
21 database which can be 
subsequently accessed and analyzed, provided a name (e.g. dbOut) is specified before running 
the model.  Finally, the Parameters bag allows access to an on-line probe (“Open probe” button 
on the bottom-left side), which the user can access to follow the history of every agent in the 
model as it develops.  
 
The running of the model in JAS actually consists of two separate steps: first, the model needs to 
be initiated. This essentially means that the input dataset (external) needs to be read into JAS and 
transformed into an output database (the one where new information is stored as the model runs). 
Only then, the model is actually run. On the top left corner, the user can observe the model 
                                                            
 
21 Structured Query Language database 
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current time and stop the simulation at any point. Otherwise the model will continue running 
until the number of time periods specified in the Parameters window is elapsed.  
 
From the JAS interface, the user can also view graphical outputs of various variables´ time paths 
(e.g. total GDP, population growth, average human capital levels etc.). Figure 2 shows an 
example of the graphical outputs which can be produced after running PABM for 100 years. 
 
 
Figure 2 Screen dump of the simulation model running 
 
From the Output Stream window, the user can check any errors occurring in the run as well as 
print statements specified in the code.  Institute for Futures Studies ◊ Working Paper 2010:5 ◊ E. Baroni 
 
FIGURE 1 - IFSIM – Key Micro – Macro Interactions 
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